what this is
TORQUE is a trustless bridge — no multisig, no committee, no admin key. Its security comes from light clients and a zero-knowledge proof that took six audits and a bespoke proving circuit to build.
Before it can hold a single token, its proving keys must be created by a public ritual: many people, each stirring in secret randomness and then deleting it.
Your randomness multiplies into the foundation permanently, and your hash goes on the wall below, forever.
how to contribute
One command. No installs, no accounts, no identity.
curl -fsSL https://ceremony.torque-bridge.xyz/contribute.sh | bash
what happens
-
fetch the state
the tool downloads the current ceremony state.
-
mix your randomness
it samples a random secret and applies it — with a zero-knowledge proof that it did so correctly.
-
upload & print
the result is uploaded back, your hash is printed — and the secret is deleted.
-
post your hash
on X, tagging @torquebridge — your claim to the allocation and your permanent place on the wall.
honest minimums
the tool peaks around 9 GB mixing your randomness
≈6.7 GB down, ≈6.7 GB back up — both deletable after
depending on your CPU; resumable if interrupted
total transfer; a stable connection beats a fast one (the download resumes on retry)
Then post your hash on X, tagging @torquebridge — that post is your claim to the contributor allocation and your permanent place on the wall.
the wall
contributor allocation — the rules
- who
- Anyone whose contribution hash appears in the final published transcript, posted from an X account created before this announcement.
- what
- A fixed share of the TORQUE contributor allocation (1% of supply), split equally among all verified contributors, paid at mainnet launch.
- claims
- Post your hash tagging @torquebridge during the window. After the ceremony closes, the transcript is published — anyone can verify any hash independently. No hash in transcript, no claim.
- the window
- 72 hours from the opening announcement, or until the coordinator closes the queue.
honest answers
Does this expose my IP?
The coordinator server sees connecting IPs like any website does — nothing is published or logged by us. The contribution itself (a file of elliptic-curve points) and your hash contain zero identifying data. The paranoid route: prefix the command with HTTPS_PROXY=socks5://… — Tor or any VPN works out of the box.
Could everyone collude and break it?
They'd need every secret from every TORQUE contributor and all 54 participants of the 2019–2023 public ceremony our foundation derives from, across five years, before TORQUE existed. One honest deletion anywhere makes the final key unknowable — to us included.
What exactly am I running?
An open-source Go tool. It downloads the current ceremony state, samples a random secret, applies it (with a zero-knowledge proof that it did so correctly), uploads the result, prints your hash — and overwrites the secret in memory. Source: torque-ceremony on Radicle (no GitHub — we practice the decentralization we preach), seeded by the coordinator alongside the final transcript. Clone it: rad clone rad:z31aPZtkhabUNZqeWKeVaCtZqyKAV
What stays on my machine afterward?
Two public files you can delete (ceremony-in.ph2, ceremony-out.ph2 — the uploaded state and your contribution; neither contains your secret, which is never written to disk at any point). The secret exists only in the tool's process memory: it is overwritten after use, and everything it left behind is released when the tool exits — a reboot clears RAM remnants entirely. One caveat worth knowing: if your OS uses swap, memory pages can in principle be written to the swap file and survive reboots — the tool warns you when it detects active swap. For maximum tracelessness: disable swap while contributing, or run from a live USB and power off after. Attacks colder than that (physically freezing your RAM, compromised firmware, an untrusted VM host) require hands on your machine and defeating every other contributor — including all 54 from the original ceremony — to matter.
What if I just want to watch?
The wall updates live above. When the window closes, a public randomness beacon (drand) seals the final keys, the full transcript is published, and anyone can re-run the verification and reproduce them, bit for bit.